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1. Introduction 
This study investigates the factors determining the order aggressiveness of 
institutional and individual investors on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). In 
addition, the study also examines the effect of the removal of broker IDs on the ASX 
on institutional and individual investors’ order aggressiveness. In so doing, we 
address three research questions. What are the factors affecting the order 
aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors? Do these factors influence 
institutional and individual investors’ order aggressiveness in a similar way? How do 
institutional and individual investors respond to the change in market transparency; in 
particular, are institutional and individual investors more or less aggressive following 
the removal of broker IDs on the ASX?1  
Consistent with Biais et al. (1995), we classify orders into different 
aggressiveness levels on the basis of the comparison of the order price and order size 
to the price and market depth of the best quote. The investigation of investors’ order 
aggressiveness is important for various reasons. First, according to Harris (1998), 
understanding the factors that affect order submission strategies will enable traders to 
decide what type of orders to submit, how to determine the order prices and how and 
when to revise or cancel their orders, if necessary. Therefore, evidence regarding the 
order aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors will facilitate traders to 
optimize their trading strategies, which, in turn, will result in lower transaction costs 
and higher portfolio returns. 
                                                 
1 From 28 November 2005, brokers can no longer observe the identification (IDs) of other brokers 
submitting orders in the ASX. Prior to this change, brokers have been able to identify, in real-time the 
broker number associated with every order (the Broker IDs) in the central limit order book for each 
security traded on the ASX. The main reason for the ASX to stop disclosing broker IDs is that exposing 
broker IDs fosters front-running activities. These activities suppress liquidity and impose extra costs on 
investors, which in turn, result in investors seeking execution outside the central market (the limit order 
book), which in turn, impairs the overall market liquidity (ASX, 2005).    
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  Second, unlike the quote-driven market where market makers are obliged to 
provide liquidity, in an order driven market such as the ASX, liquidity provision relies 
solely on the submission of orders (Bloomfield et al., 2005). The submission of limit 
orders is viewed as the provision (supply) of liquidity while market orders consume 
(demand) liquidity. Therefore, for the market as a whole, analyzing traders’ order 
submission strategies will help to understand better the market conditions under 
which traders are willing to supply (submission of limit orders) and demand 
(placement of market orders) liquidity. This will improve our understanding of the 
price formation process (Ellul et al., 2007) and the fundamental issues of how order- 
driven markets function (Bloomfield et al., 2005).  
Furthermore, examining the changing behaviour of institutional and individual 
investors in different market transparency regimes will provide better understanding 
of investors’ demand and supply of liquidity in response to a reduction in market 
transparency. These findings will be helpful to market regulators in designing the 
market mechanism that will enhance the overall market liquidity. The increasingly 
important role of limit order market as the form of security market organization2 
provides further motivation for the research on the order submission strategies of 
institutional and individual traders in the limit order market.  
The current investigation is also relevant for specialist and dealer markets such 
as NYSE and NASDAQ since the limit order book is an important part of these 
markets’ trading. For the NYSE, limit order traders play an important role in the 
market-making process with 74.9% of the quotes have at least one side originated 
                                                 
2 Glosten (1994) provides the theoretical background for the importance of order driven market. In the 
investigation of 51 stock exchanges around the world, Jain (2003) also documents that at the end of 
1999, 51% of the 51 stock markets are organized as a pure limit order book, while another 29% are 
hybrid with the limit order book as a core engine. Many prominent stock exchanges such as the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, the ASX and virtually all of the market centers in 
Europe are organized as limit order markets (Handa et al., 2003).  
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from limit-order traders (Chung et al., 1999). The limit order book (the SuperDot 
system) also accounts for 53 percent of the participations in all transactions in the 
NYSE (Harris and Hasbrouck, 1996) and as much as 45% of the volume on 
NASDAQ are traded on the electronic communication networks (ECNs), which are 
organized as electronic order book markets (Bloomfield et al., 2005).  
The study contributes to the current literature in the following dimensions. 
First, while there are extensive empirical studies on the order choice or order 
aggressiveness of investors3, few studies have made a distinction between institutional 
and individual investors’ orders in their investigation of order aggressiveness. 
Differentiating between institutional and individual orders, while examining investors 
order aggressiveness, is important since these two classes of investors potentially 
differ in their possession of private information, which leads to the better performance 
for institutional limit orders.4. Moreover, according to D’Aloisio the CEO of the ASX, 
individual investors are also an important investment group, where about 55% of the 
adult Australian population own shares. In terms of market value, individual investors 
possess at least 22% of the Australian equity market and their trading activities are 
accounted for about 51% of the market turnover as it is measured by the number of 
transactions (D’Aloisio, 2005). 
To the best of our knowledge, Aitken et al. (2007) is the only study that 
distinguishes between institutional and individual investors’ orders while analysing 
order aggressiveness. However, the main focus of their study is to highlight which 
                                                 
3 See for example Biais et al. (1995), Griffiths et al. (2000), Bae et al. (2003), Ranaldo (2004), Cao et 
al. (2004), Verhoeven et al. (2004), Beber and Caglio (2005), Hall and Hautsch (2006), Ellul et al. 
(2007) and Aitken et al. (2007).  
4 Szewczyk et al. (1992), Alangar et al. (1999) and Dennis and Weston (2001) find evidence that 
institutional investors are better informed than individual investors. Chakravarty (2001) documents that 
institutional medium-size orders have a significantly greater cumulative stock price impact than 
individual orders. Moreover, Anand, Chakravarty and Martell (2005) also show that institutional limit 
orders outperform retail limit orders 
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class of investors is more aggressive in their order submission. We contribute to the 
current literature by investigating the determinants of order aggressiveness for 
institutional investors and individual investors. We also differentiate from Aitken et 
al. (2007) by not only analyzing the factors affecting investors’ order aggressiveness 
but also highlighting whether these factors affect institutional and individual 
investors’ order aggressiveness in a similar fashion. The results of our study will 
enhance the understanding of the similarities as well as the differences in the supply 
and demand of liquidity of institutional and individual investors in order driven 
markets. 
Second, we analyze the effect of the change in the degree of market 
transparency on institutional and individual investors’ order aggressiveness. In 
contrast to the common belief that increasing market transparency will improve 
market quality, as specified in Madhavan (1992), Pagano and Roell (1996) and 
Glosten (1999), and the current trend of moving towards a more transparent market5, 
from 28 November 2005, the ASX decided to reduce the market transparency by 
removing the identification (IDs) of brokers submitting orders in the market. 
Foucault, Moinas and Theissen (2007) provide a theoretical model suggesting that the 
move to anonymity will increase (decrease) uninformed investors’ aggressiveness if 
the participation rate of the informed traders in the trading process is low (high). 
                                                 
5 For example, on April 12, 1990, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) began to disseminate information 
regarding the depth and quotes for the current inside market as well as the depth and limit orders prices 
for up to four levels above and below the current market. The NYSE also introduced the OpenBook 
service on January 24, 2002 for all securities, which provides the aggregate limit order volume 
available in the NYSE Display Book system at each price point. See Madhavan et al. (2005), Boehmer 
et al. (2005) and Baruch (2005) for a discussion of the effect of the increase in market transparency on 
market quality in the TSE and the NYSE.  
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Empirical evidence regarding the effect of the removal of broker IDs is relatively 
sparse, and often focuses almost exclusively on the effect on the bid-ask spread.6  
Comerton-Forde and Tang (2007) is the only study that analyzes the effect of 
removing broker IDs on investors’ order aggressiveness. The study documents a 
reduction in investors’ order aggressiveness following the move to anonymity. Our 
study differs from that of Comerton-Forde and Tang (2007) by differentiating 
between institutional and individual orders when investigating the impact of reducing 
market transparency on investors’ order aggressiveness. Specifically, we examine 
whether institutional and individual investors become more or less aggressive 
following the move to anonymity and whether these two groups of investors react in a 
similar or different fashion to this change in the market transparency. Moreover, we 
also incorporate the effect of market depth beyond the best quotes, rather than 
considering only the market depth at the best quote as in Comerton-Forde and Tang 
(2007), in our investigation of order aggressiveness.  
In addition, our study also differentiates from prior studies on anonymity by 
investigating the effect of the move to anonymity on investors’ order aggressiveness 
based on a natural experiment, where we examine the same market in two different 
periods where the only difference is the anonymity of liquidity suppliers. This 
differentiates us from prior studies on anonymity, which rely on the comparison 
between different markets (Garfinkel and Nimalendran, 2003 and Heidle and Huang, 
2002) or different trading venues within the same markets (Grammig et al., 2001; 
Theissen, 2002; Simaan et al., 2003 and Reiss and Werner, 2004).  
We examine the order aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors 
for 30 large capitalization (cap), 30 mid cap and 30 small cap stocks traded on the 
                                                 
6 See for example, Comerton-Forde et al. (2005), Haig et al. (2006), Foucault et al. (2007), Comerton-
Forde and Tang (2007) and Securities and Derivatives Industry Association – SDIA (2007).  
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ASX, over 171 trading days between 1 August 2005 and 31 March 2006. This sample 
period is chosen to minimize the effect of information events unrelated to the removal 
of broker IDs on investors’ order aggressiveness and also because of the 
computationally intensive nature of our investigation. Consistent with prior literature, 
we find the order aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors to be 
positively (negatively) related to the same-side (opposite-side) market depth. In 
addition, we also document a negative relation between order aggressiveness and the 
bid-ask spread, except in the small cap stocks for individual investors. However, we 
do not observe conclusive evidence regarding the effect of volatility on order 
aggressiveness, with different results obtained for both institutional and individual 
investors in the three groups of stocks. 
Consistent with Bloomfield et al. (2005) and Anand et al. (2005), we also 
highlight differences in the order aggressiveness patterns of institutional and 
individual investors over the course of the trading day. Specifically, institutional 
investors are more aggressive during the first trading hour while individual investors 
are less aggressive early on in the day and tend to increase their order aggressiveness 
as the market close approaches. In addition, individual investors are less aggressive 
when submitting large orders while institutional investors tend to increase their 
aggressiveness when submitting large orders, except in small cap stocks. We also 
observe that these differences in the order submission pattern and the response to the 
changes in the order size between institutional and individual investors are stronger in 
the anonymous market. Moreover, institutional and individual investors are more 
aggressive in their selling activities than in their buying activities, but only in mid cap 
and small cap stocks. We also document different responses of individual buyers and 
sellers to changes in spread and volatility in mid cap stocks.  
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Finally, we find both institutional and individual investors to be less 
aggressive in their order submission following the removal of broker IDs on the ASX. 
The reduction in order aggressiveness is, however, much stronger for the individual 
investors than for the institutional investors. This finding suggests that following the 
move to anonymity, both institutional and individual investors are more willing to 
display or supply liquidity to the central limit order book than demand liquidity. This 
result is also consistent with the observation of an increase in liquidity following the 
removal of broker IDs, as demonstrated in Comerton-Forde et al. (2005), Haig et al. 
(2006), Foucault et al. (2007) and Comerton-Forde and Tang (2007). Overall, our 
evidence supports the decision by the ASX to remove broker IDs in order to enhance 
the overall market liquidity.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
the current literature and develops the hypotheses to be examined in the current study. 
Section 3 describes the data to be used in the study and Section 4 explains the 
research methods. Section 5 discusses the results and implications while Section 6 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses  
2.1 The determinants of order aggressiveness 
When making trading decisions, traders can choose to submit limit orders and supply 
liquidity to the market, or post market orders and consume liquidity. The choice of 
limit or market orders reflects the trade-off between the costs and benefits of one 
particular type of order over the other. The advantage of using market orders is the 
immediacy of the order execution, but it comes with the cost of potentially paying 
higher execution prices. In contrast, limit orders provide price improvement over 
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market orders, but are associated with the risk of non-execution. Moreover, since the 
limit price is fixed overtime and monitoring might be costly, limit orders can become 
mispriced, and thus be executed at unfavourable price. This is often referred in the 
literature as the risk of being “picked-off”. The trade-off among execution probability, 
price improvement and the risk of being “picked-off” plays a key role in deciding the 
traders’ order choice.7   
Parlour (1998) develops a dynamic model of a limit order book market 
without asymmetric information to explain the traders’ choice of limit and market 
orders. According to Parlour (1998), the reduction of the market depth on the sell 
(buy) side will enhance the execution probability of a limit order at the ask (bid), 
which in turn will increase the pay-off to limit orders. Therefore, an incoming seller 
(buyer) is more likely to submit a sell (buy) limit order instead of a sell (buy) market 
order. In contrast, an increase in the market depth on the sell (buy) side reduces the 
execution probability of the incoming sell (buy) limit order. Furthermore, buyers also 
rationally anticipate the crowding out of limit orders on the sell side and so limit buy 
orders become more attractive than market buy orders. Thus, when the market depth 
on the sell side increases, an incoming seller (buyer) is more likely to submit a market 
sell order (limit buy order). Consistent with Parlour (1998), Handa et al. (2003) also 
show that the larger the excess market depth of the buy (sell) side relative to the 
market depth of the sell (buy) side, the higher the execution risk to buyers (sellers). 
Therefore, the larger (smaller) the imbalance between the buy side relative to the sell 
side, the more likely buyers (sellers) are to use market orders rather than limit orders.  
 Foucault (1999) develops a game theoretic model of price formation and 
order placement decisions in a dynamic limit order market where investors differ in 
                                                 
7 See Handa and Schwartz (1996), Harris and Hasbrouck (1996), Wald and Horrigan (2005) and 
Hollifield et al. (2006) for a discussion of the profitability of limit order trading.   
  
- 9 - 
 
their valuations but not in their private information. Foucault (1999) suggests that 
higher volatility implies greater risk of being “picked-off” for limit order submitters. 
Thus, limit order traders will demand a larger compensation for the risk of being 
“picked-off” in a more volatile market. This in turn results in a larger spread and a 
higher cost of trading with market orders. Hence, more traders find it optimal to carry 
out their trades with limit orders rather than market orders. Drawing on this intuition, 
the model predicts that the proportion of limit orders in the order flow is positively 
related to the price volatility and the bid-ask spread in limit order markets. The 
prediction of a positive relation between limit order submissions and the bid-ask 
spread is also consistent with the theoretical model of Cohen et al. (1981), in which 
limit orders become more attractive as the bid-ask spread increases.   
Empirical analysis of investors’ order submission strategies generally provides 
support for theoretical predictions of the effect of spread and market depth on the 
order aggressiveness of investors. This support is consistent and robust for different 
markets and over different sample periods (see for example Biais et al., 1995; 
Griffiths et al., 2000; Ranaldo, 2004; Verhoeven et al., 2004; Cao et al., 2004; Beber 
and Caglio, 2005; Hall and Hautsch, 2006; Ellul et al., 2007 and Aitken et al., 2007).  
The effect of volatility on order aggressiveness is less conclusive. Bae et al. 
(2003), Ranaldo (2004) and Beber and Caglio (2005) document a positive relation 
between the placement of limit orders and volatility, as predicted by Foucault (1999). 
In contrast, in their investigation of the orders submitted in Island ECN for the 300 
largest NASDAQ National Market stocks during the forth quarter of 1999, Hasbrouck 
and Saar (2002) find that higher volatility is generally associated with a lower 
proportion of limit orders in the incoming order flow. Similarly, in their examination 
of investors’ order aggressiveness for a sample of 38 stocks traded on the ASX during 
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2001, Aitken et al. (2007) also document that investors are actually more aggressive 
when volatility increases.  
The different empirical evidence regarding the effect of volatility on order 
aggressiveness can be attributed to the assumption of risk-neutral investors in the 
Foucault (1999) model. According to Hasbrouck and Saar (2002), the prediction of 
this model might not be applicable to risk-averse investors.8 Moreover, higher 
volatility might also imply greater costs of order monitoring and management, which 
in turn reduces the use of limit order strategies. Based on the previous theoretical 
models and empirical results, we formulate the following hypotheses regarding the 
effect of market depth, bid-ask spread and volatility on order aggressiveness: 
 H1: Order aggressiveness is positively (negatively) related to the same-side 
(opposite-side) market depth. 
H2: Order aggressiveness is negatively related to the bid-ask spread. 
H3: Order aggressiveness is negatively related to the price volatility. 
 Harris (1998) derives a model for optimal dynamic order submission 
strategies, which encompasses three types of traders: uninformed liquidity traders, 
informed traders and value-motivated traders. In this model, both liquidity and 
informed traders become more aggressive as the trading progresses. While liquidity 
traders are focusing to achieve their daily targets towards the end of the trading 
session, the informed traders are also trying to transact rapidly in order to take 
advantage of their ‘information’ before it is revealed to the market.  
This argument by Harris (1998) is supported by Beber and Caglio (2005), who 
document the increasing aggressiveness of orders throughout the day in their analysis 
                                                 
8 Wald and Horrigan (2005) observe that for a risk-averse investor, higher volatility increases the 
execution probability of limit orders, but it is also associated with larger adverse selection costs. The 
authors show that the higher adverse selection costs associated with increased volatility can outweigh 
the benefits of higher fill rates for limit orders. Thus, a rise in volatility would result in a decline in the 
use of limit orders relative to market orders.  
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of 10 stocks traded on the NYSE during the period from November 1990 to January 
1991.  
Bloomfield et al. (2005) provide experimental evidence that informed traders 
are more aggressive and trade mostly with market orders early in the trading day. 
However, in contrast to Harris (1998), they document that towards the end of the 
trading day, rather than becoming more aggressive, informed traders, on average, 
trade more with limit orders than market orders. Uninformed investors behave in the 
opposite fashion. They are less aggressive early on in the trading day and become 
more aggressive as the trading expiration approaches. Anand et al. (2005) and Ellul et 
al. (2007) offer empirical support for the experimental evidence of Bloomfield et al. 
(2005). Drawing on the findings in prior literature that institutional traders are 
informed and individual traders are uninformed, Anand et al. (2005) show that 
institutional (informed) investors are more aggressive and use more market orders in 
the first half of the trading day than in the second half. In addition, Ellul et al. (2007) 
also observe a positive (negative) relation between elapsed trading time and the 
probability of limit orders (market sell orders) for 148 stocks traded on the NYSE 
during the week between April 30 and May 4, 2001.  
Based on the evidence presented in Bloomfield et al. (2005), Anand et al. 
(2005) and Ellul et al. (2007), and on the findings in prior studies that institutional 
investors are better informed,9 we formulate the following hypothesis regarding the 
pattern of investors’ order aggressiveness over the course of the trading day: 
H4: Institutional (individual) investors are more (less) aggressive early on in 
the trading day than at the end of the trading day.  
 
                                                 
9 See for example, Szewczyk et al. (1992), Alangar et al. (1999), Dennis and Weston (2001) and 
Chakravarty (2001).    
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2.2 Order aggressiveness and the removal of broker IDs 
The literature on the informativeness of broker identification is relatively sparse and 
often focuses on the effect of withdrawing (or disclosing) broker IDs on bid-ask 
spread.10 Foucault et al. (2007) develop a theoretical model for a limit order market to 
explain the changing aggressiveness of informed and uninformed traders after the 
removal of brokers IDs. In a transparent market, uninformed investors infer 
information about future price movements from observing the quotation behaviour of 
informed traders. They will try to front-run the informed traders to benefit from the 
information by setting more competitive quotes than those posted by the informed 
traders. The informed traders respond by sometimes engaging in bluffing strategies, 
posting non-aggressive orders and setting wider spreads than appropriate. In an 
anonymous trading system, uninformed traders cannot distinguish informed traders’ 
orders from those of uninformed traders. They submit orders based on the belief about 
the identity of the traders with the orders in the limit order book. In this case, if the 
participation rate of informed traders is small (large), uninformed traders will be more 
(less) aggressive, and improve on the already posted orders more (less) often.11  
Comerton-Forde and Tang (2007) examines the effect of removing the broker 
IDs on market quality. They document a reduction in bid-ask spreads, adverse 
selection risk, trade execution costs and order exposure risk after the removal of 
                                                 
10 Comerton-Forde et al. (2005), Foucault et al. (2007) and Comerton-Forde and Tang (2007) observe a 
reduction in the bid-ask spread following the move to anonymity in the Euronext Paris, the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange and the ASX. On the other hand, Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) document a larger 
spread after the Korea Stock Exchange started disclosing broker IDs information.  
11 Alternatively, Simaan et al. (2003) propose the collusion hypothesis which argues that a non-
anonymous trading system facilitates collusion among liquidity suppliers. Therefore, traders’ 
aggressiveness is lower under the non-anonymous trading system compared to the anonymous system. 
In support of this hypothesis, Simaan et al. (2003) document evidence that dealers post more aggressive 
quotes in an anonymous market (the ECNs) than in a transparent market where dealers’ IDs are 
displayed (the NASDAQ). Since the ASX is a limit order market, we will formulate our hypothesis 
regarding the effect of the removal broker IDs in the ASX on investors’ order aggressiveness based on 
Foucault et al. (2007) model.  
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broker IDs on the ASX. They also observe a reduction in order aggressiveness 
following the move to anonymity.   
Drawing on the insights of Foucault et al. (2007), we argue that if institutional 
investors are better informed than individual investors, in the non-anonymous trading 
system they will submit aggressive orders to minimize the risk of being front-run by 
other traders. Since the risk of front-running activities is reduced in an anonymous 
trading system, institutional investors will be less aggressive and submit limit orders 
more often after the removal of broker IDs on the ASX. For individual investors, in 
the non-anonymous trading system, they observe the order submissions by 
institutional investors and try to front-run these orders by submitting more aggressive 
orders. After the removal of broker IDs, individual investors cannot differentiate 
orders submitted by institutional investors from those submitted by other individual 
investors. This reduces their ability to engage in front-running activities, and thus 
individual investors will also be less aggressive in their order submission following 
the move to anonymity. Based on the above discussion, we formulate the following 
hypothesis regarding the effect of the move to anonymity on investors’ order 
aggressiveness:  
H5: A move to anonymity decreases institutional and individual investors’ 
order aggressiveness.  
 
3. Data 
We investigate the determinants of order aggressiveness for the 30 large cap, 30 mid 
cap and 30 small cap stocks traded on the ASX between August 2005 and March 
2006. The selection criteria for the stocks under investigation include both the stocks' 
market capitalization and trading activity. First, we consider only common stocks so 
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all the unit trusts and preference shares are excluded. We also include only seasoned 
stocks with at least 3 years of trading history. Second, we require that all the stocks 
under investigation must be included in the S&P 200 index on 29 July 2005 (the day 
before our sample period), 25 November 2005 (the day before the removal of broker 
IDs) and 31 Mar 2006 (the end of sample period). The choice of S&P 200 index 
ensure the representation of large cap, mid cap and small cap stocks as well as the 
institutional trading interest and the liquidity of the stocks under investigation. The 
large cap stocks are defined as the stocks included in the S&P 50 index while the mid 
cap and small cap stocks are the stocks included in the S&P 100 index but not in the 
S&P 50 index, and the stocks included in S&P 200 index but not in the S&P 100 
index, respectively.  
Third, we rank all large cap, mid cap and small cap stocks based on the daily 
average number of trades for the 3-month period before our sample (May to July 
2005). The 30 large cap stocks and small cap stocks chosen are the 30 most traded 
large cap stocks and the 30 least traded small cap stocks based on the daily average 
number of trades for the period between May and July 2005, respectively. The 30 mid 
cap stocks chosen are the 15 stocks above and the 15 stocks below the stocks with 
median daily average number of trades for the period between May and July 2005.  
We obtain two different datasets from the Securities Industry Research Centre 
of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) for the investigation of the order aggressiveness of 
institutional and individual investors. The first dataset is the unique Order book 
dataset which records each order, including the order type (order submission, order 
revision, order cancellation), the date and time to the nearest hundredth of a second, 
stock code, order price, order volume and order direction (buy or sell order). Each 
new order is assigned a unique identification number (ID) so that we can track the 
  
- 15 - 
 
order from its submission through to any revision, cancellation or execution. A unique 
feature of this dataset is the provision of the confidential dummy variable indicating 
whether the order is submitted by an institutional or an individual investor.12 In this 
study, only the orders submitted in the continuous trading session (from 10:10 am to 
4:00 pm) are included. In addition, we only analyze standard orders, so that crossing 
orders, All or Nothing orders and Fill and Kill orders are excluded.   
The second dataset is the Market depth data, also provided by SIRCA, which 
contains information on the market depth of a particular stock. Specifically, it details 
the 10 best limit prices on the bid and ask side, in association with the total volume 
(number of shares) and the total number of orders at each price level. This dataset is 
updated whenever there is a change to the price and/or volume to any of these 10 best 
limit prices. We remove all the observations in the Market depth dataset whenever the 
bid price is greater than the ask price at any of the 10 limit price levels. We also 
exclude all observations where the bid (ask) prices are not in strict descending 
(ascending) order from the first to the tenth best prices.  
For our purpose of investigating the order aggressiveness of institutional and 
individual investors, we match the Order book dataset to the Market depth dataset. 
Thus, we arrive at a final dataset that contains detailed information on every 
institutional or individual order submitted, revised or cancelled together with the 
market depth information at the time of order submission, revision or cancellation.  
 
4. Research Methodology 
Consistent with Biais et al. (1995), we classify orders into six levels of order 
aggressiveness. Category 1, the most aggressive orders, are buy (sell) orders with the 
                                                 
12 This confidential dataset is released by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and provided to us via 
SIRCA. 
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prices greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quotes and the size of the orders exceeds 
the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. These orders will be executed against the 
volume at the ask (bid) and in part against the market depth available higher (lower) 
in the book up to the order price. The unfilled portion of the order will enter as limit 
orders in the order book. Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices equal to 
the best ask (bid) quotes and demand more volume than the market depth at the best 
ask (bid) quote. These orders will be executed immediately and the unfilled portion 
will become limit orders at that price in the limit order book. Category 3 orders are 
orders with price equal to the opposite best quote and demand less volume than the 
market depth at the best opposite quote. These orders will be executed immediately 
and in full. Category 4 and 5 orders are limit orders within and at the prevailing 
quotes, respectively. Category 6 orders are the least aggressive, in the sense that they 
are buy (sell) orders with prices less (greater) than the best bid (ask) quotes. Based on 
this classification, Category 1, 2 and 3 can be classified as market orders, since they 
result in immediate execution, while Category 4, 5 and 6 orders are limit orders, as 
these orders are not executed immediately. These orders stand in the limit orders 
book, waiting for execution.    
The determinants of institutional and individual investors’ order 
aggressiveness will be investigated based on the ordered probit model. The ordered 
probit model consists of two parts. The first part relates the observable action types 
( iR ) to the latent linking variable ( iZ ) as follows:  
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Ri is the order aggressiveness, classified as suggested by Biais et al. (1995). μk is the 
intercept parameter to be estimated. In the second part of the model, the latent 
variable Zi is in turn modelled as follows:  
Zi = β1 Depthsame,i + β2 Depthopposite,i + β3 Spreadi + β4 Volai + β5 FirstInti + β6 Sizei  
         + β7 Directioni + β8 Anonymousi + εi ,                                                        (1) 
where Depthsame,i (Depthopposite,i) is the natural logarithm of the same-side (opposite-
side) market depth, in term of number of shares, at the time of order submission. 
Spreadi is the relative bid-ask spread, measured as the percentage of the bid-ask 
spread over the bid-ask midpoint, at the time of the order submission. Following 
Ranaldo (2004), Volai is defined as the standard deviation of the 20 most recent mid 
quote returns multiplied by 100. FirstInti is a dummy variable that equals one for 
orders submitted between 10:10 am and 11:00 am and zero otherwise. Directioni is a 
dummy variable that equals one for sell orders and zero otherwise. Sizei is the natural 
logarithm of the number of shares in a particular order. Anonymousi is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one for orders submitted from 28 November 2005 
onwards (in the anonymous trading system) and zero otherwise. 
Besides spread, market depth and volatility, we include a dummy variable for 
the first trading hour to examine the potential differences in the order aggressiveness 
of institutional and individual investors in the early part of the trading day, as 
suggested by Bloomfield et al. (2005) and Anand et al. (2005). The dummy variable 
Directioni is included to control for the potential asymmetry between buy and sell 
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orders, as documented in Keim and Madhavan (1995) and Ranaldo (2004). Sizei is 
also incorporated in the order probit regression to examine the relation between order 
size and its aggressiveness. Finally, Anonymousi is incorporated into the ordered 
probit model to investigate the effect of the removal of broker IDs on investors’ order 
aggressiveness. If investors are more (less) aggressive following the move to 
anonymity, we should expect β8 to be negative (positive) and significant. In order to 
highlight the potentially different impact an explanatory variable might have on the 
order aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors, the ordered probit 
model as given with equation (1) is estimated separately for institutional orders and 
individual orders.  
 We also perform the analysis of the institutional and individual investors’ 
order aggressiveness for the buy orders and sell orders separately to highlight the 
potential differences in the determinants of the order aggressiveness of buyers and 
sellers as documented in Ranaldo (2004). We estimate the following ordered probit 
model for institutional and individual investors’ buy and sell orders: 
Zi = β1 Depthsame,i + β2 Depthopposite,i + β3 Spreadi + β4 Volai + β5 FirstInti + β6 Sizei  
        + β7 Anonymousi + εi                                                                                 (2) 
 In addition to incorporating the dummy variable for orders submitted in 
anonymous market as in equation (1) and (2), we also examine the effect of the move 
to anonymity on investors’ order aggressiveness by analyzing the determinants of 
institutional and individual investors’ order aggressiveness separately for the 
transparent market and for the anonymous market. The model is specified as follows: 
 Zi = β1 Depthsame,i + β2 Depthopposite,i + β3 Spreadi + β4 Volai + β5 FirstInti + β6 Sizei  
        + β7 Directioni + εi                                                                                 (3) 
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 Besides relying on the coefficient estimates of the ordered probit regressions, 
we also examine the marginal effects induced by an incremental variation in the 
regressors. Specifically, if the latent order aggressiveness εβ += 'xZ , the marginal 
effects of changes in the regressors are calculated as follows: 
ββμφδ
δ )(]1Pr[ '1 xx
R −−==         (4) 
ββμφβμφδ
δ )]()([]Pr[ ''1 xxx
mR
mm −−−== −  for m = 2,3,4,5  (5) 
ββμφδ
δ )(]6Pr[ '5 xx
R −==         (6) 
where φ (.) is the density normal distribution,β (s) are the coefficient estimates from 
equation (3). 1μ , 2μ , 3μ , 4μ , 5μ are the intercept parameters (limit points) estimated in 
equation (3). In the current study, we utilize the individual observations of the 
regressors rather than the regressors’ mean value for estimating the marginal effects. 
In other words, based on equation (4), (5) and (6), we calculate the value of β'x  
based on each individual value of the explanatory variables rather than the mean value 
of the regressors. The reported marginal probabilities for will be the average of all the 
estimated marginal probabilities calculated based on the individual observations of the 
explanatory variables.     
 
5. Results and Discussion  
 5.1 Statistics of order submissions 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the orders submitted for the 90 stocks under 
investigation. In total, we investigate 16,438,201 orders, including 7,207,314 orders 
submitted by institutional investors and 9,230,887 orders submitted by individual 
investors. Similar to Aitken et al. (2007), Category 5 orders are the most common 
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order type for institutional investors while the most common order type for individual 
investors is Category 6 orders. In addition, consistent with Parlour (1998) and Handa 
et al. (2003), both institutional and individual investors tend to submit aggressive 
(market) orders when the same-side market depth is higher than the opposite-side 
market depth. For both institutional and individual investors, the relative bid-ask 
spread is also higher at the time of limit order submission than at the time of market 
order submission. These observations present early support for the effect of spread 
and market depth on order aggressiveness, as specified in Hypothesis 1 and 2.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
 
 5.2 The distribution of order aggressiveness levels 
Table 2 provides information regarding the distribution of order aggressiveness levels 
over the course of the trading day. In the current study, we partition the trading day 
into six intervals: 10:10 am-11:00 am, 11:00 am-12:00 pm, 12:00 pm-1:00 pm, 1:00 
pm-2:00pm, 2:00 pm-3:00pm and 3:00pm-4:00 pm.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
From Table 2, we observe that the order aggressiveness of institutional 
investors has a U-shaped pattern. Institutional investors are more aggressive and 
demand more liquidity (place more market orders) early on in the trading day than in 
other intervals. As the trading day progresses, institutional investors become less 
aggressive and submit fewer market orders and more limit orders. Towards the end of 
the trading day, institutional investors increase their order aggressiveness. However, 
the order aggressiveness of institutional investors at the end of the trading day is not 
as high as it is at the beginning of the trading day. Individual investors behave in an 
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opposite fashion; they are less aggressive early on in the day and become more 
aggressive as the trading deadline approaches. This is reflected by the increase 
(decrease) in the use of market (limit) orders towards the end of the trading day.  
We also investigate the effect of the removal of broker IDs on the distribution 
of investors’ order aggressiveness. The results presented in Table 3 suggest that 
institutional and individual investors appear to be less aggressive and reduce their use 
of market orders following the move to anonymity. In contrast, both groups of 
investors tend to increase their use of limit orders in the anonymous market, with the 
largest increases observed for Category 5 orders for institutional investors and 
Category 6 orders for individual investors  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
5.3 The order aggressiveness of institutional and individual investors  
Table 4 presents the results of investigating the determinants of order aggressiveness 
for institutional and individual investors, based on the ordered probit model specified 
in equation (1). Since the aggressiveness levels are ranked from 1 (the most 
aggressive) to 6 (the least aggressive), a negative coefficient indicates a positive 
relation between the explanatory variable and investors’ order aggressiveness.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
From Table 4, we observe positive (negative) and significant relation between 
the same-side (opposite-side) market depth and order aggressiveness for all stocks 
under investigation. These results are consistent for both institutional and individual 
investors’ orders and provide support for Hypothesis 1. Consistent with prior 
literature,13 these findings suggest that the market depth can be viewed as a proxy for 
the execution probability and thus will affect investors’ order aggressiveness. Both 
                                                 
13 See for example, Biais et al. (1995), Parlour (1998), Griffiths et al. (2000), Ranaldo (2004), Cao et al. 
(2004), Beber and Caglio (2005), Hall and Hautsch (2006), Ellul et al. (2007) and Aitken et al. (2007).  
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institutional and individual investors tend to submit more aggressive orders when the 
same-side market depth increases or when the opposite-side market depth decreases. 
In contrast, investors tend to submit less aggressive orders when the same-side market 
depth decreases or when the opposite-side increases.  
 We also find the majority of the coefficients for the bid-ask spread to be 
positive and significant for institutional investors’ orders. This finding supports 
Hypothesis 2, which suggests a negative relation between the order aggressiveness of 
institutional investors and the bid-ask spread. The order aggressiveness of individual 
investors is also negatively related to the bid-ask spread but only in the large cap and 
mid cap stocks. In small cap stocks, individual investors tend to submit more 
aggressive orders when the spread widens.    
The finding for the effect of volatility on investors’ order aggressiveness is 
less conclusive. For large cap stocks, we observe a positive relation between the order 
aggressiveness of institutional investors and volatility. In contrast, a negative relation 
between institutional investors’ order aggressiveness and volatility is documented in 
mid cap stocks while this relation is insignificant for the majority of small cap stocks. 
For individual investors, their order aggressiveness is negatively related to volatility 
in mid cap stocks but positively related to volatility in small cap stocks. In contrast, 
there is no clear-cut evidence regarding the direction or the significance of the relation 
between volatility and individual investors’ order aggressiveness for large cap stocks.  
Our finding regarding the effect of volatility on order aggressiveness is similar 
to the mixed empirical evidence in prior literature. Higher volatility is associated with 
the higher risk of being “picked-off” by better-informed investors. Therefore, if 
institutional investors are better-informed and monitor the order book more closely, 
they will try to “pick-off” mispriced limit orders more in the high volatile period. 
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Since the limit order book is thicker for large cap stocks than for mid and small cap 
stocks, the execution costs are relatively lower for institutional investors to adopt this 
trading strategy in large cap stocks than in mid and small cap stocks. Thus, we 
observe a positive relation between volatility and order aggressiveness for 
institutional investors in large cap stocks but not in mid cap and small cap stocks.   
On the other hand, because the prices of small cap stocks are also relatively 
smaller compared to large cap and mid cap stocks, a similar change in price will result 
in a larger absolute return in small cap stocks compared to large cap and mid cap 
stocks. Therefore, investors in small cap stocks are potentially more risk-averse than 
in large and mid cap stocks. Hasbrouck and Saar (2002) and Wald and Horrigan 
(2005) suggest that for risk-averse investors, a rise in volatility results in the increase 
in the submission of market orders. Thus, our finding of a positive relation between 
order aggressiveness and volatility for individual investors in small cap stocks might 
reflect a higher risk-aversion of individual investors in those stocks in comparison to 
large cap and mid cap stocks. 
We also document that institutional and individual investors adopt different 
order submission strategies over the course of the trading day. For institutional 
investors, negative and significant coefficient estimates for the FirstInt variable are 
observed for the majority of large cap, mid cap and small cap stocks under 
investigation. This implies that institutional investors are more aggressive in the first 
hour of the trading day. In contrast, for individual orders, the majority of the 
coefficient estimates for the FirstInt variables are positive and significant. This result 
indicates that individual investors are less aggressive and use more limit orders during 
the first trading hour.  
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Overall, the results in Table 2 and the results regarding the FirstInt variable 
presented in Table 4 support our fourth hypothesis. Institutional investors and 
individual investors in our studies tend to behave similarly to the informed and 
uninformed investors, as documented in Bloomfield et al. (2005) and Anand et al. 
(2005). Institutional investors are potentially the better-informed investors14, they 
submit more aggressive orders early on in the trading when information asymmetry is 
high and prices have not converged to their true value. As trading progresses and 
information is incorporated into prices, institutional investors switch to using limit 
orders and provide liquidity to the market. Individual investors behave in the opposite 
direction; they are less aggressive early on in the trading day and more aggressive as 
trading expiration approaches to achieve their trading targets.15  
 With regard to the relation between order size and order aggressiveness, the 
results in Panel A of Table 4 indicate that in large and mid cap stocks, the larger the 
institutional investors’ orders, the more aggressive they are. In contrast, in small cap 
stocks, institutional investors are often less aggressive when they submit a large order. 
For individual investors, if they submit a large order, this order is often non-
aggressive as well. This contrasting behaviour of institutional and individual investors 
suggests that for institutional investors, the non-execution risk is more important than 
the “picked-off” risk when submitting large orders. In contrast, the “picked-off” risk 
appears to be more important for individual investors when placing large orders.16 
                                                 
14 See for example, Szewczyk et al. (1992), Alangar et al. (1999), Dennis and Weston (2001), 
Chakravarty (2001) and Anand et al. (2005). 
15 We also incorporate the remaining time (in hours) until market closing time (TTC) into the ordered 
probit regression. Negative (positive) and significant coefficient estimates for the TTC variable are 
observed for institutional (individual) investors in the majority of large cap, mid cap and small cap 
stocks. This evidence indicates that institutional investors are more aggressive early on in the trading 
day while individual investors are more aggressive in their order submission towards the end of the 
trading day. These results are consistent with those presented in Table 4 and are available upon request 
from the authors.  
16 Our result regarding the relation between order size and order aggressiveness of institutional and 
retail investors might also provide explanation for the finding in Aitken et al. (2007) that order 
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Finally, we document mixed results regarding the relation between order 
direction and order aggressiveness. The results in Table 4 show that institutional 
investors’ sell orders are more aggressive than their buy orders, especially in mid cap 
and small cap stocks. In contrast, individual investors’ sell orders are more (less) 
aggressive than buy orders in small cap and mid cap stocks (large cap stocks). This 
finding implies that institutional and individual investors consider a higher 
opportunity cost of non-execution for sell orders in mid and small cap stocks while 
individual investors are more patient in their selling activities in large cap stocks. 
 
5.4 The order aggressiveness of buy and sell orders  
We investigate the order aggressiveness of institutional investors’ buy and sell orders 
in Table 5. We observe consistent results regarding the same-side market depth, the 
opposite-side market depth, the bid-ask spread, volatility and order size for both buy 
and sell orders. In addition, the majority of the coefficient estimates for the FirstInt 
variable in Panel A of Table 5 are negative and significant, which indicates that 
institutional investors tend to be more aggressive early on in the trading day for buy 
orders. In contrast, we observe a similar pattern in institutional sell orders only in 
large cap and mid cap stocks. For small cap stocks, the majority of the coefficient 
estimates for the FirstInt variable in Panel B of Table 5 are insignificant. This finding 
suggests that in small cap stocks, there is no tendency for institutional investors to be 
more aggressive in their selling activities early on in the day. This difference in results 
for buy and sell orders suggests that if the behaviour of institutional investors 
                                                                                                                                            
aggressive is positively related to order size for heavily traded stocks and negatively related to order 
size for lightly traded stocks. The overall positive relation between order size and order aggressiveness 
in heavily traded stocks is driven by the positive relation between order size and the order 
aggressiveness of institutional investors. In contrast, we will observe a negative relation between order 
size and order aggressiveness in lightly traded stocks since both institutional and individual investors’ 
order aggressiveness are negatively related to the order size for small caps stocks.  
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throughout the day can be explained by their information advantage over individual 
investors, institutional investors tend to exploit their information advantage using buy 
orders. This is also consistent with the finding of Griffiths et al. (2000) that aggressive 
buy orders are more likely to be motivated by information than sell orders.   
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 The results of investigating the order aggressiveness of individual investors’ 
buy and sell orders are given in Table 6. For individual investors, the buy and sell 
order aggressiveness is positively related to the same-side market depth and 
negatively related to the opposite-side market depth and the order size. In addition, 
the majority of the coefficient estimates for the FirstInt variable are positive and 
significant. This finding suggests that individual investors are less aggressive in both 
their buying and selling activities early on in the trading day. The most significant 
difference in the effect of spread and volatility on individual buy and sell orders are 
observed in mid cap stocks. In mid cap stocks, when the spread increases, individual 
investors tend to submit less aggressive buy orders but more aggressive sell orders. 
Similarly, a rise in volatility will result in the submission of less aggressive buy orders 
but more aggressive sell orders. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
 5.5 Anonymity and investors’ order aggressiveness 
We investigate the effect of the removal of broker IDs on investors’ order 
aggressiveness by comparing the proportion of market and limit orders submitted by 
institutional and individual investors before and after the move to anonymity Results 
of this investigation appear in Table 3. In addition, we also incorporate a dummy 
variable indicating orders submitted in the anonymous trading system (orders 
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submitted from 28 November 2005 onwards) to the ordered probit model in equations 
(1) and (2).  
In addition to the results in Table 3, from Tables 4, 5 and 6, we also obtain a 
positive and significant coefficient estimate for the Anonymous variable for the 
majority of the stocks analyzed in this study. This evidence is consistent for all three 
groups of stocks, for both buy and sell orders and for both institutional and individual 
investors, with stronger results obtained for individual investors. This finding is also 
consistent with the observation of the reduction in the use of market orders for both 
institutional and individual investors in Table 3. Overall, the results in Tables 3, 4, 5 
and 6 provide support for Hypothesis 5. Our findings indicate that both institutional 
and individual investors are less aggressive in their order submission and tend to 
supply liquidity rather than demand liquidity following the move to anonymity. This 
result is also consistent with the evidence documented in prior studies17 and provides 
support for the decision to cease displaying the broker IDs in order to enhance the 
overall market liquidity by the ASX.  
In order to examine the effect of the move to anonymity on the investors’ 
order aggressiveness further, we investigate the determinants of institutional and 
individual investors’ order aggressiveness in the transparent market (before 28 
November 2005) and in the anonymous market (from 28 November 2005 onwards), 
as specified in equation (3). The results of this investigation are presented in Tables 7 
and 8. 
[INSERT TABLES 7 and 8 HERE] 
Table 7 provides consistent results regarding the effect of market depth, 
spread, volatility, order size and the order direction (except in large cap stocks) in 
                                                 
17 See for example, Comerton-Forde et al. (2005), Haig et al. (2006), Foucault et al. (2007) and 
Comerton-Forde and Tang (2007). 
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both the transparent and anonymous market. The results regarding the FirstInt 
variable suggest that institutional investors are more aggressive in the first hour of the 
trading day, with stronger results observed in the anonymous market, especially for 
small cap stocks. This finding is consistent with the suggestion of Foucault et al. 
(2007) that risk of front-running activities in the transparent market might result in the 
informed traders sometimes engaging in bluffing strategies and posting less 
aggressive orders than would be appropriate. In an anonymous market with smaller 
risk of front-running activities, institutional investors will increase their submission of 
aggressive orders when their information advantage is arguably largest.  
For individual investors, the most significant differences when examining the 
two market regimes are observed for the effect of order size and the first trading hour 
on order aggressiveness. In the transparent market, individual investors are more 
aggressive when submitting large orders while they tend to be less aggressive when 
placing large orders in the anonymous market. This pattern in order submission is 
consistent with that of the institutional investors in large cap and mid cap stocks. In 
addition, individual investors are also less aggressive in the first trading hour, 
especially in the small cap stocks and in the anonymous market. Overall, these 
findings suggest that in an anonymous market where uninformed investors cannot 
identify the order submission of informed investors, they tend to submit less 
aggressive orders when the information asymmetry is potentially higher (in the first 
hour of the trading day) and when risk of being “picked-off” is higher (when their 
order size is larger).  
In addition to the coefficient estimates, we also analyze the marginal effects 
induced by an incremental variation in one of the explanatory variables based on 
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equations (4), (5) and (6). The results of this investigation are given in Tables 9, 10 
and 11.  
[INSERT TABLES 9, 10, AND 11 HERE] 
The marginal effects analysis in Tables 9, 10 and 11 shows that a change in 
the same-side (opposite-side) market depth is associated with a positive (negative) 
marginal reaction for market order traders and a negative (positive) marginal reaction 
for limit order traders. A change in the bid-ask spread is also associated with a 
negative reaction for market order traders and a positive reaction for limit order 
traders. The switching normally occurs between traders who place limit orders within 
the quotes (Category 4 orders) and the traders who submit orders at the quote 
(Category 5 orders). Consistent with the results in Table 7 and 8, we observe 
inconclusive evidence regarding the marginal effects for the Volatility and Direction 
variable. Institutional investors generally increase the probability of submitting 
aggressive orders during the first trading hour while individual investors tend to 
decrease the probability of submitting aggressive orders in the same period. Finally, 
institutional and individual investors also differ in their marginal reaction to a change 
in the order size in large and mid cap stocks in the anonymous market regime and in 
small cap stocks in the transparent market regime. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study investigates the factors affecting the order aggressiveness of institutional 
and individual investors and examines the effect of the removal of broker IDs on the 
ASX on the order aggressiveness of these two classes of investors. Investigating the 
order submissions during the period between 1 August 2005 and 31 March 2006, we 
document strong support for the role of market depth and the bid-ask spread in 
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affecting both institutional and individual investors’ order aggressiveness in all three 
groups of stocks. The effect of volatility is less conclusive. Both institutional and 
individual investors are more likely to place less aggressive orders when volatility 
increases, but only in mid cap stocks.  
In addition, institutional investors are more aggressive early on in the trading 
day and become less aggressive as the trading day progresses while individual 
investors behave in an opposite manner. Institutional investors are also more likely to 
increase their aggressiveness when placing large orders in large and mid cap stocks 
while large orders submitted by individual investors are more likely to be non-
aggressive. These differences in the behaviour of institutional and individual investors 
over the course of the trading day and in response to changes in the order size are 
stronger in the anonymous market than in the transparent market. We also find 
individual buyers and sellers to react differently to changes in spread and volatility in 
mid cap stocks. Finally, we document that both groups of investors become less 
aggressive in their order submission after the removal of broker IDs on the ASX, with 
stronger evidence documented for individual investors. This finding suggests an 
enhancement to market liquidity where both institutional and individual investors tend 
to increase their supply of liquidity, following the move to anonymity.  
Our results regarding the order aggressiveness of institutional and individual 
investors in an order driven market provide important implication for the quote driven 
and hybrid market as well. Glosten (1994) develop a theoretical model suggesting that 
the limit order book will be the inevitable form of stock market organization. Even in 
hybrid market such as NYSE, Chung et al. (1999) also document that  
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Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) document that the NYSE SuperDOT system 
accounts for 53% of the participants in all transactions, but only 30% of the buy and 
sell volume  
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Appendix: Order aggressiveness classification 
This appendix provides details on the order aggressiveness classification scheme 
applied in the current study. Consistent with Biais et al. (1995), we classify orders 
into six aggressiveness levels. Category 1 orders are buy (sell) orders with the prices 
greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quotes and the size of the orders exceeds the 
market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with 
prices equal to the best ask (bid) quotes and demand more volume than the market 
depth at the best ask (bid) quote. Category 3 orders are orders with price equal to the 
opposite best quote and demand less volume than the market depth at the best 
opposite quote. Category 4 and 5 orders are limit orders within and at the prevailing 
quotes, respectively. Category 6 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices less (greater) 
than the best bid (ask) quotes. For example, consider stock AAA, which has the best 
bid (ask) quote at time t of B1 (A1) and the market depth available at this quote is VB1 
(VA1). We determine the order aggressiveness level (OAi,t) of the incoming order i at 
time t with price Pi and size Vi as follows:  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of order submissions  
This table presents summary statistics of the order submissions for the institutional and individual orders in this study. The sample period is between 1 August 2005 and 31 
March 2006, totalling 171 trading days. Following Biais et al. (1995), orders are classified into six aggressiveness levels. Category 1 orders are buy (sell) orders with the 
prices greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quotes and the order size exceeds the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices 
equal to the best ask (bid) quotes and demand more volume than the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. Category 3 orders are orders with price equal to the opposite 
best quote and demand less volume than the market depth at the best opposite quote. Category 4 and 5 orders are limit orders within and at the prevailing quotes, respectively. 
Category 6 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices less (greater) than the best bid (ask) quotes. “Frequency” is the number of orders submitted at a particular aggressiveness 
level. “% of all orders” is the percentage of the number of orders in a particular order aggressiveness level over all orders. “Order size” is the average number of shares 
submitted in an order. “Depth at best same (opposite)” is the average number of shares at the best same-side (opposite-site) quote at the time of order submission. “Depth at 
same (opposite)” is the average number of shares at the 10 best same-side (opposite-side) quote at the time of order submission. “Relative spread” is the average relative 
spread, which is calculated as the bid ask spread over the bid-ask midpoint, at the time of the order submission. “Volatility” is the average volatility, which is calculated as the 
standard deviation of the most recent 20 mid-quote returns at the time of order submission multiplied by 100.  
Panel A: Institutional orders  
Aggressiveness 
Level Frequency 
% of all 
orders Order Size
Depth at best 
same








1 109,097 1.51% 6,913 7,492 1,647 67,648 62,783 0.1974 0.0187 
2 531,215 7.37% 16,232 26,536 7,256 192,121 183,360 0.1154 0.0343 
3 1,691,793 23.47% 4,150 52,741 42,792 387,009 378,632 0.1725 0.0309 
4 741,463 10.29% 2,708 9,508 9,053 77,498 77,738 0.2907 0.0414 
5 2,827,552 39.23% 4,577 36,230 45,792 352,889 354,237 0.1562 0.0338 
6 1,306,194 18.12% 5,501 16,768 22,653 183,594 189,667 0.1676 0.0258 
Panel B: Individual orders  
Aggressiveness 
Level Frequency 
% of all 
orders Order Size
Depth at best 
same








1 159,935 1.73% 6,533 9,458 1,708 88,605 80,792 0.2031 0.0248 
2 524,809 5.69% 11,649 26,167 5,294 198,326 181,578 0.1353 0.0396 
3 2,198,717 23.82% 4,009 97,022 80,293 739,030 712,801 0.1691 0.0295 
4 713,470 7.73% 3,103 11,813 10,401 91,927 90,202 0.3495 0.0475 
5 2,525,904 27.36% 5,382 62,758 76,078 587,172 592,409 0.2082 0.0395 
6 3,108,052 33.67% 8,935 52,632 59,792 511,331 509,305 0.2023 0.0351 
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Table 2: The distribution of order aggressiveness levels over the trading day 
This table presents the distribution of order aggressiveness level over the trading day. Following Biais et al. (1995), order are classified into six aggressiveness levels. 
Category 1 orders are buy (sell) orders with the prices greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quotes and the order size exceeds the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. 
Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices equal to the best ask (bid) quotes and demand more volume than the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. Category 3 
orders are orders with price equal to the opposite best quote and demand less volume than the market depth at the best opposite quote. Category 4 and 5 orders are limit 
orders within and at the prevailing quotes, respectively. Category 6 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices less (greater) than the best bid (ask) quotes. Orders with 
aggressiveness levels from 1 to 3 are market orders and orders with aggressiveness levels from 4 to 6 are limit orders. The trading day is divided into six intervals: 10:10 am-
11:00 am, 11:00 am-12:00 pm, 12:00 pm-1:00 pm, 1:00 pm-2:00pm, 2:00 pm-3:00pm and 3:00pm-4:00 pm. “MO” (“LO”) refers to the total number of market (limit) orders 
in a particular interval. “Total” is the total number of orders submitted in a particular interval. “% MO” (“% LO”) is the percentage of market (limit) orders out of all orders 
submitted in a particular interval. 
 
Panel A: Institutional orders 
Interval Levels of order aggressiveness  MO LO Total % MO % LO 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
10.10 am-11:00 am 21,943 113,479 314,930 170,333 468,445 206,327 450,352 845,105 1,295,457 34.76% 65.24% 
11:00 am-12:00 pm 29,904 88,591 294,694 140,510 429,819 251,380 413,189 821,709 1,234,898 33.46% 66.54% 
12:00 pm-1:00 pm 12,031 56,689 197,752 83,601 351,399 188,706 266,472 623,706 890,178 29.93% 70.07% 
1:00 pm-2:00pm 6,661 35,564 152,441 60,981 310,315 147,939 194,666 519,235 713,901 27.27% 72.73% 
2:00 pm-3:00pm 17,067 93,636 284,888 121,778 556,481 227,619 395,591 905,878 1,301,469 30.40% 69.60% 
3:00pm-4:00 pm 21,491 143,256 447,088 164,260 711,093 284,223 611,835 1159,576 1,771,411 34.54% 65.46% 
 
Panel B: Individual orders 
Interval Levels of order aggressiveness MO LO Total % MO % LO 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
10.10 am-11:00 am 37,639 114,474 429,256 174,945 511,381 728,550 581,369 1,414,876 1,996,245 29.12% 70.88% 
11:00 am-12:00 pm 39,242 88,731 399,647 131,958 417,144 629,005 527,620 1,178,107 1,705,727 30.93% 69.07% 
12:00 pm-1:00 pm 20,453 62,788 295,059 90,382 342,058 433,258 378,300 865,698 1,243,998 30.41% 69.59% 
1:00 pm-2:00pm 14,277 42,032 220,244 62,354 260,894 314,822 276,553 638,070 914,623 30.24% 69.76% 
2:00 pm-3:00pm 20,109 85,691 351,401 104,574 417,444 450,128 457,201 972,146 1,429,347 31.99% 68.01% 
3:00pm-4:00 pm 28,215 131,093 503,110 149,257 576,983 552,289 662,418 1,278,529 1,940,947 34.13% 65.87% 
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Table 3: Anonymity and the distribution of order aggressiveness 
This table presents the distribution of institutional and individual order aggressiveness for two periods: Pre-Anonymity (before 28 November 2005) and Post-Anonymity 
(from 28 November 2005 onwards). Following Biais et al. (1995), order are classified into six aggressiveness levels. Category 1 orders are buy (sell) orders with the prices 
greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quotes and the order size exceeds the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices equal to 
the best ask (bid) quotes and demand more volume than the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. Category 3 orders are orders with price equal to the opposite best quote 
and demand less volume than the market depth at the best opposite quote. Category 4 and 5 orders are limit orders within and at the prevailing quotes, respectively. Category 
6 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices less (greater) than the best bid (ask) quotes. “% Inst. orders” and “% Indi. orders” refers to the percentage out of all institutional and 
individual orders, respectively. 
Panel A: Institutional orders 
Aggressiveness 
Level 
Large Cap Stocks Mid Cap Stocks Small Cap Stocks 
Pre-Anonymity Post-Anonymity Pre-Anonymity Post-Anonymity Pre-Anonymity Post-Anonymity 
 Frequency % Inst. 
orders 
Frequency % Inst. 
orders 
Frequency % Inst. 
orders  
Frequency % Inst. 
orders 
Frequency % Inst. 
orders 
Frequency % Inst. 
orders   
1 21,145 1.06% 32,641 1.23% 17,274 2.14% 18,674 1.65% 8,618 3.17% 10,745 3.07% 
2 183,110 9.15% 212,325 8.03% 47,162 5.85% 58,258 5.14% 13,543 4.99% 16,817 4.80% 
3 439,600 21.96% 548,787 20.75% 205,405 25.49% 285,590 25.19% 88,938 32.74% 123,473 35.25% 
4 205,911 10.29% 241,968 9.15% 98,173 12.18% 115,737 10.21% 38,816 14.29% 40,858 11.67% 
5 816,715 40.80% 1,128,554 42.68% 291,641 36.20% 420,792 37.12% 69,423 25.56% 100,427 28.67% 
6 335,372 16.75% 479,876 18.15% 146,080 18.13% 234,619 20.70% 52,317 19.26% 57,930 16.54% 
Panel B: Individual orders 
Aggressiveness 
Level 
Large Cap Stocks Mid Cap Stocks Small Cap Stocks 
Pre-Anonymity Post-Anonymity Pre-Anonymity Post-Anonymity Pre-Anonymity Post-Anonymity 
 Frequency % Indi. 
orders 
Frequency % Indi. 
orders 
Frequency % Indi. 
orders  
Frequency % Indi. 
orders 
Frequency % Indi. 
orders 
Frequency % Indi. 
orders   
1 37,473 1.42% 44,767 1.45% 24,250 2.36% 22,774 1.64% 14,663 3.17% 16,008 2.51% 
2 172,831 6.55% 180,721 5.87% 54,831 5.33% 65,051 4.70% 23,731 5.13% 27,644 4.34% 
3 740,285 28.04% 776,187 25.22% 221,499 21.53% 263,803 19.05% 91,833 19.85% 105,110 16.51% 
4 210,613 7.98% 200,577 6.52% 100,698 9.79% 95,328 6.88% 54,681 11.82% 51,573 8.10% 
5 672,830 25.48% 819,425 26.63% 334,911 32.56% 395,509 28.56% 142,831 30.87% 160,398 25.20% 
6 806,235 30.54% 1,055,936 34.31% 292,475 28.43% 542,566 39.17% 134,955 29.17% 275,885 43.34% 
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Table 4: The determinants of institutional & individual order aggressiveness  
This table presents results of investigating the determinants of institutional and individual investors’ order aggressiveness. We estimate the following ordered probit model for 
institutional and individual orders: Zi = β1 Depthsame,i + β2 Depthopposite,i + β3 Spreadi + β4 Volatilityi + β5 FirstInti + β6 Sizei + β7 Directioni + β8 Anonymousi + εi, where Zi is 
the latent order aggressiveness, Depthsame,i (Depthopposite,i) is the natural logarithm of the same-side (opposite-side) market depth, in term of number of shares, at the time of 
order submission. Spreadi is the relative bid-ask spread at the time of the order submission. Volatilityi is defined as the standard deviation of the 20 most recent mid-quote 
returns multiplied by 100. FirstInti is the dummy variable for the first trading hour of the trading day. Directioni and Anonymousi is the dummy variable for sell orders and for 
orders submitted from 28 November 2005 onwards, respectively. Sizei is the natural logarithm of the number of shares in the particular order. “Coeff” refers to the average of 
the estimated coefficients. % t-stat > 1.96 (% t-stat < -1.96) refers to the percentage of coefficients that is positive (negative) and significant at the 5% level. 
Panel A: Institutional orders 
 Large Cap Stocks Mid Cap Stocks Small Cap Stocks 
 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 
Depthsame -0.0823 0% 100.00% -0.0686 13.33% 80.00% -0.0687 20.00% 66.67% 
Depthopposite 0.1002 96.67% 0% 0.1138 90.00% 6.67% 0.0412 43.33% 13.33% 
Spread 0.5522 86.67% 6.67% 0.1654 70.00% 3.33% 0.1394 86.67% 3.33% 
Volatility -0.3840 33.33% 66.67% 0.1141 50.00% 26.67% -0.0408 13.33% 26.67% 
FirstInt -0.1081 0% 100.00% -0.0699 6.67% 90.00% -0.0275 10.00% 46.67% 
Size -0.1197 3.33% 96.67% -0.0411 10.00% 90.00% 0.0385 66.67% 30.00% 
Direction -0.0038 36.67% 40.00% -0.0066 26.67% 50.00% -0.0309 30.00% 46.67% 
Anonymous 0.0341 63.33% 20.00% 0.0338 50.00% 26.67% 0.0160 56.67% 20.00% 
Panel B: Individual orders 
 Large Cap Stocks Mid Cap Stocks Small Cap Stocks 
 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 
Depthsame -0.0856 0% 96.67% -0.0632 0% 76.67% -0.1123 3.33% 83.33% 
Depthopposite 0.0599 86.67% 6.67% 0.0431 76.67% 10.00% 0.0718 50.00% 10.00% 
Spread 1.0103 93.33% 3.33% 0.0420 46.67% 33.33% -0.0425 20.00% 50.00% 
Volatility -0.9454 33.33% 36.67% 0.0024 40.00% 16.67% -0.1152 6.67% 50.00%  
FirstInt 0.0544 93.33% 0% 0.0189 63.33% 6.67% 0.0483 73.33% 3.33% 
Size 0.0260 60.00% 30.00% 0.0349 73.33% 16.67% 0.0402 73.33% 13.33% 
Direction 0.0032 50.00% 26.67% 0.0003 40.00% 43.33% -0.0474 20.00% 53.33% 
Anonymous 0.0937 90.00% 3.33% 0.1555 96.67% 3.33% 0.2789 93.33% 6.67% 
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Table 5: The determinants of institutional buy and sell order aggressiveness  
This table presents results of investigating the determinants of institutional investors’ buy and sell order aggressiveness. We estimate the following ordered probit model for 
institutional investors’ buy and sell orders: Zi = β1 Depthsame,i + β2 Depthopposite,i + β3 Spreadi + β4 Volatilityi + β5 FirstInti + β6 Sizei + β7 Anonymousi + εi, where Zi is the latent 
order aggressiveness, Depthsame,i (Depthopposite,i) is the natural logarithm of the same-side (opposite-side) market depth, in term of number of shares, at the time of order 
submission. Spreadi is the relative bid-ask spread at the time of the order submission. Volatilityi is defined as the standard deviation of the 20 most recent mid-quote returns 
multiplied by 100. FirstInti is the dummy variable for the first hour of the trading day. Sizei is the natural logarithm of the number of shares in the particular order. 
Anonymousi is the dummy variable for orders submitted from 28 November 2005 onwards. “Coeff” refers to the average of the estimated coefficients. % t-stat > 1.96 (% t-
stat < -1.96) refers to the percentage of coefficients that is positive (negative) and significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Institutional buy orders 
 Large Cap Stocks Mid Cap Stocks Small Cap Stocks 
 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 
Depthsame -0.0767 0% 90.00% -0.0673 20.00% 63.33% -0.0413 16.67% 56.67% 
Depthopposite 0.1016 100.00% 0% 0.1350 70.00% 3.33% 0.0794 66.67% 10.00% 
Spread 0.6356 80.00% 6.67% 0.1979 66.67% 13.33% 0.1500 83.33% 10.00% 
Volatility -0.2759 26.67% 53.33% 0.2095 60.00% 26.67% -0.0371 33.33% 33.33% 
FirstInt -0.1108 3.33% 96.67% -0.0668 6.67% 80.00% -0.0519 10.00% 56.67% 
Size -0.1109 3.33% 96.67% -0.0317 10.00% 90.00% 0.0498 70.00% 16.67% 
Anonymous 0.0273 46.67% 33.33% 0.0330 50.00% 30.00% 0.0454 53.33% 20.00% 
 
Panel B: Institutional sell orders 
 Large Cap Stocks Mid Cap Stocks Small Cap Stocks 
 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 
Depthsame -0.0897 0% 96.67% -0.0846 0% 70.00% -0.1290 16.67 % 70.00% 
Depthopposite 0.1024 100.00% 0% 0.0976 73.33% 20.00% 0.0161 36.67 % 36.67% 
Spread 0.4833 76.67% 6.67% 0.1333 63.33% 13.33% 0.1348 76.67 % 3.33% 
Volatility -0.5032 33.33% 60.00% -0.0104 50.00% 30.00% -0.0396 23.33 % 23.33% 
FirstInt -0.1043 3.33% 96.67% -0.0716 6.67% 76.67% -0.0035 26.67 % 26.67% 
Size -0.1290 3.33% 96.67% -0.0524 6.67% 86.67% 0.0234 46.67 % 36.67% 
Anonymous 0.0413 66.67% 16.67% 0.0415 56.67% 26.67% -0.0006 43.33 % 26.67% 
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Table 6: The determinants of individual buy and sell order aggressiveness  
This table presents results of investigating the determinants of individual investors’ buy and sell order aggressiveness. We estimate the following ordered probit model for 
individual investors’ buy and sell orders: Zi = β1 Depthsame,i + β2 Depthopposite,i + β3 Spreadi + β4 Volatilityi + β5 FirstInti + β6 Sizei + β7 Anonymousi + εi, where Zi is the latent 
order aggressiveness, Depthsame,i (Depthopposite,i) is the natural logarithm of the same-side (opposite-side) market depth, in term of number of shares, at the time of order 
submission. Spreadi is the relative bid-ask spread at the time of the order submission. Volatilityi is defined as the standard deviation of the 20 most recent mid-quote returns 
multiplied by 100. FirstInti is the dummy variable for the first hour of the trading day. Sizei is the natural logarithm of the number of shares in the particular order. 
Anonymousi is the dummy variable for orders submitted from 28 November 2005 onwards. “Coeff” refers to the average of the estimated coefficients. % t-stat > 1.96 (% t-
stat < -1.96) refers to the percentage of coefficients that is positive (negative) and significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Individual buy orders 
 Large Cap Stocks Mid Cap Stocks Small Cap Stocks 
 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 
Depthsame -0.0875 0% 90.00% -0.1078 13.33% 66.67% -0.1064 10.00% 70.00% 
Depthopposite 0.0670 80.00% 10.00% 0.0547 63.33% 20.00% 0.0920 60.00% 10.00% 
Spread 1.1959 90.00% 3.33% 0.1150 60.00% 33.33% -0.0295 23.33% 43.33% 
Volatility -0.8287 33.33% 30.00% -0.0079 53.33% 30.00% -0.0415 20.00% 36.67% 
FirstInt 0.0412 80.00% 3.33% 0.0329 53.33% 10.00% 0.0568 60.00% 10.00% 
Size 0.0211 63.33% 36.67% 0.0430 76.67% 10.00% 0.0418 80.00% 13.33% 
Anonymous 0.0993 86.67% 13.33% 0.2585 96.67% 0% 0.2979 90.00% 3.33% 
 
Panel B: Individual sell orders 
 Large Cap Stocks Mid Cap Stocks Small Cap Stocks 
 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 
Depthsame -0.0904 6.67% 83.33% -0.0860 10.00% 80.00% -0.1377 6.67% 70.00% 
Depthopposite 0.0564 83.33% 6.67% 0.0696 73.33% 16.67% 0.0672 53.33% 16.67% 
Spread 0.8008 90.00% 0% -0.0178 26.67% 36.67% -0.0497 26.67% 43.33% 
Volatility -1.0234 33.33% 36.67% -0.0387 33.33% 40.00% -0.2086 13.33% 53.333% 
FirstInt 0.0669 90.00% 0% 0.0230 53.33% 16.67% 0.0399 60.00% 13.33% 
Size 0.0308 63.33% 26.67% 0.0555 80.00% 13.33% 0.0409 70.00% 20.00% 
Anonymous 0.0930 86.67% 10.00% 0.1865 96.67% 0% 0.2605 93.33% 6.67% 
 
  
- 44 - 
 
Table 7: The determinants of institutional order aggressiveness in transparent and anonymous market 
This table presents results of investigating the determinants of institutional investors’ order aggressiveness in transparent and anonymous market. We estimate the following 
ordered probit model for institutional investors’ orders: Zi = β1 Depthsame,i + β2 Depthopposite,i + β3 Spreadi + β4 Volatilityi + β5 FirstInti + β6 Sizei + β7 Directioni + εi, where Zi is 
the latent order aggressiveness, Depthsame,i (Depthopposite,i) is the natural logarithm of the same-side (opposite-side) market depth, in term of number of shares, at the time of 
order submission. Spreadi is the relative bid-ask spread at the time of the order submission. Volatilityi is defined as the standard deviation of the 20 most recent mid-quote 
returns multiplied by 100. FirstInti is the dummy variable for the first hour of the trading day. Sizei is the natural logarithm of the number of shares in the particular order. 
Directioni is the dummy variable for sell orders. “Coeff” refers to the average of the estimated coefficients. % t-stat > 1.96 (% t-stat < -1.96) refers to the percentage of 
coefficients that is positive (negative) and significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Transparent market 
 Large Cap Stocks Mid Cap Stocks Small Cap Stocks 
 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 
Depthsame -0.0481 10.00% 66.67% -0.0373 26.67% 46.67% -0.1090 13.33% 56.67% 
Depthopposite 0.1002 96.67% 0% 0.0995 66.67% 3.33% 0.0782 63.33% 3.33% 
Spread 0.6383 83.33% 6.67% 0.1615 60.00% 20.00% 0.1203 80.00% 10.00% 
Volatility -0.6394 23.33% 70.00% 0.0065 40.00% 23.33% -0.0881 10.00% 26.67% 
FirstInt -0.1046 0% 90.00% -0.0429 13.33% 66.67% 0.0173 23.33% 13.33% 
Size -0.1301 0% 100.00% -0.0509 6.67% 90.00% 0.0282 53.33% 26.67% 
Direction -0.0113 26.67% 60.00% -0.0129 33.33% 50.00% -0.0083 23.33% 43.33% 
 
Panel B: Anonymous market 
 Large Cap Stocks Mid Cap Stocks Small Cap Stocks 
 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 
Depthsame -0.1141 0% 100.00% -0.1022 6.67% 83.33% -0.0621 16.67% 56.67% 
Depthopposite 0.1036 96.67% 0% 0.1261 76.67% 10.00% 0.0257 46.67% 20.00% 
Spread 0.5243 83.33% 3.33% 0.1881 83.33% 3.33% 0.1815 83.33% 0% 
Volatility -0.1521 33.33% 56.67% 0.2163 46.67% 16.67% 0.0369 30.00% 23.33% 
FirstInt -0.1117 3.33% 96.67% -0.0938 0% 93.33% -0.0735 6.67% 63.33% 
Size -0.1118 3.33% 96.67% -0.0334 10.00% 86.67% 0.0468 73.33% 20.00% 
Direction 0.0033 40.00% 36.67% -0.0029 33.33% 50.00% -0.0361 30.00% 46.67% 
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Table 8: The determinants of individual order aggressiveness in transparent and anonymous market 
This table presents results of investigating the determinants of individual investors’ order aggressiveness in transparent and anonymous market. We estimate the following 
ordered probit model for institutional investors’ orders: Zi = β1 Depthsame,i + β2 Depthopposite,i + β3 Spreadi + β4 Volatilityi + β5 FirstInti + β6 Sizei + β7 Directioni + εi, where Zi is 
the latent order aggressiveness, Depthsame,i (Depthopposite,i) is the natural logarithm of the same-side (opposite-side) market depth, in term of number of shares, at the time of 
order submission. Spreadi is the relative bid-ask spread at the time of the order submission. Volatilityi is defined as the standard deviation of the 20 most recent mid-quote 
returns multiplied by 100. FirstInti is the dummy variable for the first hour of the trading day. Sizei is the natural logarithm of the number of shares in the particular order. 
Directioni is the dummy variable for sell orders. “Coeff” refers to the average of the estimated coefficients. % t-stat > 1.96 (% t-stat < -1.96) refers to the percentage of 
coefficients that is positive (negative) and significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Transparent market 
 Large Cap Stocks Mid Cap Stocks Small Cap Stocks 
 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 
Depthsame -0.0788 0% 93.33% -0.0766 10.00% 76.67% -0.1340 6.67% 73.33% 
Depthopposite 0.0614 86.67% 6.67% 0.0550 60.00% 6.67% 0.1147 66.67% 10.00% 
Spread 0.9082 90.00% 6.67% -0.0003 10.00% 40.00% 0.0061 40.00% 33.33% 
Volatility -0.9172 20.00% 36.67% 0.0805 46.67% 16.67% -0.0562 16.67% 30.00% 
FirstInt 0.0387 60.00% 0% 0.0073 36.67% 33.33% 0.0218 33.33% 6.67% 
Size -0.0373 16.67% 80.00% -0.0469 13.33% 76.67% -0.0205 26.67% 60.00% 
Direction 0.0118 50.00% 30.00% 0.0339 93.33% 30.00% -0.0286 33.33% 53.33% 
 
Panel B: Anonymous market 
 Large Cap Stocks Mid Cap Stocks Small Cap Stocks 
 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 Coeff % t-stat > 1.96 % t-stat < -1.96 
Depthsame -0.0959 3.33% 93.33% -0.1105 3.33% 86.67% -0.1128 10.00% 76.67% 
Depthopposite 0.0588 86.67% 6.67% 0.0639 66.67% 6.67% 0.0555 40.00% 36.67% 
Spread 1.0783 93.33% 6.67% 0.0895 50.00% 26.67% -0.0954 10.00% 76.67% 
Volatility -0.9364 40.00% 36.67% -0.1279 30.00% 33.33% -0.1467 6.67% 36.67% 
FirstInt 0.0608 86.67% 3.33% 0.0459 76.67% 6.67% 0.0642 76.67% 0% 
Size 0.0685 83.33% 16.67% 0.1111 100.00% 0% 0.0877 100.00% 0% 
Direction -0.0066 40.00% 33.33% -0.0256 33.33% 53.33% -0.0527 16.67% 53.33% 
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Table 9: Marginal probabilities for large cap stocks 
This table presents results of the marginal probabilities based on the investigation of institutional and individual investors’ order aggressiveness in large cap stocks in 
transparent and anonymous market. We estimate following ordered probit model: Zi = β1 Depthsame,i + β2 Depthopposite,i + β3 Spreadi + β4 Volatilityi + β5 FirstInti + β6  Sizei + β7 
Directioni + εi. The marginal probabilities are calculated as follows: ββμφδδ )(/]1Pr[ '1 xxR −−== , ββμφβμφδδ )]()([/]Pr[ ''1 xxxmR mm −−−== −  for m = 
2,3,4,5 and ββμφδδ )(/]6Pr[ '5 xxR −== , where φ (.) is the density normal distribution,β (s) are the coefficient estimates and 1μ , 2μ , 3μ , 4μ , 5μ are the intercept 
parameters (limit points) estimated in the ordered probit equation. 
Panel A: Institutional orders 
 Transparent market Anonymous market 
 Levels of Order Aggressiveness Levels of Order Aggressiveness 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Depthsame 0.0012 0.0065 0.0089 0.0016 -0.0067 -0.0115 0.0024 0.0133 0.0230 0.0032 -0.0147 -0.0272 
Depthopposite -0.0022 -0.0138 -0.0186 -0.0029 0.0143 0.0232 -0.0022 -0.0124 -0.0207 -0.0029 0.0138 0.0244 
Spread -0.0163 -0.0999 -0.1027 -0.0199 0.0819 0.1569 -0.0142 -0.0733 -0.0883 -0.0179 0.0580 0.1357 
Volatility 0.0237 0.1118 0.0792 0.0289 -0.0614 -0.1822 0.0288 0.0450 -0.0462 0.0334 0.0670 -0.1280 
FirstInt 0.0024 0.0146 0.0189 0.0032 -0.0146 -0.0245 0.0029 0.0141 0.0209 0.0036 -0.0152 -0.0263 
Size 0.0029 0.0182 0.0237 0.0038 -0.0185 -0.0301 0.0029 0.0146 0.0202 0.0039 -0.0152 -0.0264 
Direction 1.61x10-5 0.0016 0.0023 7.91x10-5 -0.0021 -0.0018 -0.0002 -0.0013 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0006 
Panel B: Individual orders 
 Transparent market Anonymous market 
 Levels of Order Aggressiveness Levels of Order Aggressiveness 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Depthsame 0.0025 0.0082 0.0179 0.0017 -0.0038 -0.0265 0.0026 0.0085 0.0215 0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0335 
Depthopposite -0.0024 -0.0068 -0.0135 -0.0012 0.0033 0.0206 -0.0020 -0.0057 -0.0129 -0.0011 0.0018 0.0199 
Spread -0.0344 -0.1099 -0.1949 -0.0126 0.0445 0.3073 -0.0439 -0.1183 -0.2199 -0.0219 0.0384 0.3656 
Volatility 0.0242 0.1073 0.1898 0.0222 0.0033 -0.3468 0.0196 0.0781 0.1431 0.0282 0.0786 -0.3476 
FirstInt -0.0009 -0.0037 -0.0096 -0.0006 0.0013 0.0135 -0.0021 -0.0060 -0.0133 -0.0013 0.0017 0.0210 
Size 0.0019 0.0051 0.0067 0.0009 -0.0020 -0.0126 -0.0016 -0.0055 -0.0155 -0.0013 -0.0005 0.0244 
Direction -0.0011 -0.0024 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0004 0.0044 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0022 0.0001 0.0006 -0.0024 
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Table 10: Marginal probabilities for mid cap stocks 
This table presents results of the marginal probabilities based on the investigation of institutional and individual investors’ order aggressiveness in mid cap stocks in 
transparent and anonymous market. We estimate following ordered probit model: Zi = β1 Depthsame,i + β2 Depthopposite,i + β3 Spreadi + β4 Volatilityi + β5 FirstInti + β6 Sizei + β7 
Directioni + εi. The marginal probabilities are calculated as follows: ββμφδδ )(/]1Pr[ '1 xxR −−== , ββμφβμφδδ )]()([/]Pr[ ''1 xxxmR mm −−−== −  for m = 
2,3,4,5 and ββμφδδ )(/]6Pr[ '5 xxR −== , where φ (.) is the density normal distribution,β (s) are the coefficient estimates and 1μ , 2μ , 3μ , 4μ , 5μ are the intercept 
parameters (limit points) estimated in the ordered probit equation. 
Panel A: Institutional orders 
 Transparent market Anonymous market 
 Levels of Order Aggressiveness Levels of Order Aggressiveness 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Depthsame 0.0023 0.0036 0.0077 0.0007 -0.0059 -0.0084 0.0035 0.0087 0.0238 0.0023 -0.0144 -0.0239 
Depthopposite -0.0055 -0.0091 -0.0206 -0.0025 0.0137 0.0240 -0.0049 -0.0114 -0.0284 -0.0036 0.0164 0.0319 
Spread -0.0081 -0.0169 -0.0341 -0.0039 0.0239 0.0391 -0.0073 -0.0177 -0.0423 -0.0049 0.0292 0.0430 
Volatility 0.0078 0.0009 -0.0280 0.0096 0.0457 -0.0360 -0.0014 -0.0216 -0.0851 0.0037 0.1025 0.0019 
FirstInt 0.0023 0.0046 0.0091 0.0011 -0.0072 -0.0099 0.0030 0.0088 0.0222 0.0021 -0.0155 -0.0206 
Size 0.0027 0.0056 0.0116 0.0009 -0.0103 -0.0105 0.0018 0.0047 0.0090 0.0010 -0.0099 -0.0066 
Direction -0.0003 0.0012 0.0028 0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0036 4.97x10-6 0.0010 -0.0008 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0007 
Panel B: Individual orders 
 Transparent market Anonymous market 
 Levels of Order Aggressiveness Levels of Order Aggressiveness 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Depthsame 0.0039 0.0069 0.0152 0.0029 -0.0047 -0.0242 0.0046 0.0077 0.0197 0.0045 0.0044 -0.0409 
Depthopposite -0.0030 -0.0043 -0.0102 -0.0027 0.0024 0.0178 -0.0025 -0.0050 -0.0118 -0.0022 -0.0023 0.0238 
Spread 0.0002 -0.0035 -0.0009 0.0019 0.0018 0.0005 -0.0047 -0.0099 -0.0178 -0.0018 -1.70x10-5 0.0342 
Volatility -0.0062 -0.0064 -0.0204 -0.0009 0.0150 0.0189 0.0004 0.0072 0.0203 0.0033 0.0176 -0.0488 
FirstInt 0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0020 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0025 -0.0023 -0.0042 -0.0081 -0.0020 -0.0006 0.0172 
Size 0.0030 0.0048 0.0083 0.0020 -0.0034 -0.0147 -0.0040 -0.0081 -0.0205 -0.0038 -0.0048 0.0412 
Direction -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0060 -0.0012 0.0005 0.0116 0.0009 0.0024 0.0041 0.0011 0.0013 -0.0098 
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Table 11: Marginal probabilities for small cap stocks 
This table presents results of the marginal probabilities based on the investigation of institutional and individual investors’ order aggressiveness in small cap stocks in 
transparent and anonymous market. We estimate following ordered probit model: Zi = β1 Depthsame,i + β2 Depthopposite,i + β3 Spreadi + β4 Volatilityi + β5 FirstInti + β6  Sizei + β7 
Directioni + εi. The marginal probabilities are calculated as follows: ββμφδδ )(/]1Pr[ '1 xxR −−== , ββμφβμφδδ )]()([/]Pr[ ''1 xxxmR mm −−−== −  for m = 
2,3,4,5 and ββμφδδ )(/]6Pr[ '5 xxR −== , where φ (.) is the density normal distribution,β (s) are the coefficient estimates and 1μ , 2μ , 3μ , 4μ , 5μ are the intercept 
parameters (limit points) estimated in the ordered probit equation. 
Panel A: Institutional orders 
 Transparent market Anonymous market 
 Levels of Order Aggressiveness Levels of Order Aggressiveness 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Depthsame 0.0067 0.0081 0.0236 0.0005 -0.0130 -0.0259 -0.0006 0.0045 0.0208 0.0011 -0.0101 -0.0157 
Depthopposite -0.0057 -0.0062 -0.0177 0.0006 0.0111 0.0179 0.0002 -0.0025 -0.0093 -0.0005 0.0051 0.0070 
Spread -0.0082 -0.0108 -0.0286 0.0011 0.0221 0.0244 -0.0124 -0.0137 -0.0427 0.0007 0.0285 0.0396 
Volatility 0.0012 0.0081 0.0177 0.0017 -0.0085 -0.0202 -0.0095 -0.0028 -0.0038 0.0024 0.0179 -0.0042 
FirstInt -0.0005 -0.0013 -0.0041 6.36x10-5 0.0021 0.0038 0.0032 0.0059 0.0198 7.95x10-5 -0.0131 -0.0158 
Size -0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0065 5.30x10-5 0.0023 0.0065 -0.0015 -0.0032 -0.0125 9.75x10-5 0.0075 0.0097 
Direction 0.0013 0.0019 0.0041 -0.0008 -0.0071 0.0006 -0.0006 0.0034 0.0124 -8.50x10-5 -0.0098 -0.0054 
Panel B: Individual orders 
 Transparent market Anonymous market 
 Levels of Order Aggressiveness Levels of Order Aggressiveness 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Depthsame 0.0097 0.0105 0.0238 0.0051 -0.0045 -0.0446 0.0074 0.0073 0.0185 0.0050 0.0051 -0.0433 
Depthopposite -0.0095 -0.0090 -0.0205 -0.0045 0.0051 0.0384 -0.0039 -0.0029 -0.0092 -0.0024 -0.0029 0.0213 
Spread -0.0012 -0.0019 -0.0013 0.0012 0.0023 0.0009 0.0054 0.0059 0.0161 0.0043 0.0051 -0.0368 
Volatility 0.0022 0.0046 0.0094 0.0017 0.0034 -0.0213 0.0052 0.0107 0.0252 0.0042 0.0112 -0.0565 
FirstInt -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0037 -0.0009 -0.0005 0.0081 -0.0042 -0.0043 -0.0104 -0.0033 -0.0024 0.0246 
Size 0.0017 0.0015 0.0034 0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0062 -0.0054 -0.0062 -0.0146 -0.0039 -0.0036 0.0337 
Direction 0.0016 0.0025 0.0051 0.0016 -0.0010 -0.0098 0.0028 0.0041 0.0088 0.0024 0.0021 -0.0202 
 
